There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...) and finds independent support from general considerations about the differences between rules and aims. (shrink)

According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: (...) To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true. (shrink)

This paper analyses the communicative and epistemic value of retweeting (and more generally of reposting content on social media). Against a naïve view, it argues that retweets are not acts of endorsement, motivating this diagnosis with linguistic data. Retweeting is instead modelled as a peculiar form of quotation, in which the reported content is indicated rather than reproduced. A relevance-theoretic account of the communicative import of retweeting is then developed, to spell out the complex mechanisms by which retweets achieve their (...) communicative goals. The last section outlines the epistemic threats posed by the increasing prevalence of retweeting on social media, linking them to the low reputational, cognitive and practical costs linked to this emerging form of communication. (shrink)

Un'introduzione all'epistemologia della testimonianza e ai testi contenuti nella sezione.

Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...) which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to define group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I offer a definition that drops condition (i) and significantly broadens condition (ii). (shrink)

Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of (...) two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying. (shrink)

In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with (...) lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss' proposed 'worse-off requirement' meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the 'comparative insincerity condition' (Marsili 2014) can meet both. The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a sincerity norm. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...) given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker intends not to Φ , or believes that he will not Φ , or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. (shrink)

Speech acts are governed by a variety of illocutionary norms. Building on Sbisà’s (2019) work, this chapter attempts to develop a common framework to study them. Four families of illocutionary rules are identified: (i) Validity rules set conditions for (actual) performance; (ii) Cooperative rules set conditions for cooperative performance; (iii) Illocutionary goals set conditions for successful performance; (iv) Illocutionary obligations set conditions for compliance. Illocutionary rules are often taken to play a constitutive role: speech acts are said to be constituted (...) by the unique set of rules that regulates them. Against this view, it is argued that many illocutionary rules are instead best construed as rationally derivable expectations of cooperation. This alternative paradigm provides fertile ground to reconcile scholarly disagreement between speech act theorists, and yields a promising explanation of how illocutionary norms are learned and evolve through time. (shrink)

How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this (...) alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view. (shrink)

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...) a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. (shrink)

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...) second part of the thesis, I consider these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative solution to some known puzzles concerning the permissibility of false assertions. In my view, assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true. (shrink)

Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that something is actually the case in the real world. The ‘Nonassertion’ View firmly denies this possibility. In this paper, I defend a nuanced version of the Nonassertion View. I argue that even if fictions cannot assert, they can indirectly communicate that what is (...) recounted as fictional is actually true. I show that this view is supported by independent linguistic data, and that it is able to defuse the objections that are typically raised against the Nonassertion View. I conclude by showing that this position has some interesting implications for testimonial cognitivism about fiction. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section (...) analyses assertions that express graded beliefs, exploring how mitigation and reinforcement can alter the insincerity conditions for lying. The last section considers the case of lies that attack certainty (knowledge-lies), understood as attempt to alter the hearer's graded beliefs. (shrink)

According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand (...) the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted. (shrink)

In a recent book (_Lying and insincerity_, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.

What is lying? This entry provides a general overview of scholarly attempts to define lying in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it addresses the distinction between lying and misleading, considering whether only explicit statements can be lies. The second topic is insincerity, and how it can vary in degrees under conditions of uncertainty. Its final part discusses whether lying requires an intent to deceive and genuine assertoric force.

Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article introduces two views that support a positive answer, (...) and two that support a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie. (shrink)

There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion. In asserting, you describe reality as being in a certain way, and you succeed only if reality is indeed in that way. This tells us under which conditions assertions are successful, but not (...) yet under which condition they are permissible. The second half of the paper explores the possibility of deriving assertability constraints from the view that truth is the aim of assertion, appealing to some general principles of cooperation. The assertability expectations predicted by this account are loose and sensitive to features of the context. I conclude by highlighting some important reasons to prefer this view over alternative accounts. (shrink)

Despite the importance of human blood to clinical practice and research, hematology and blood transfusion data remain scattered throughout a range of disparate sources. This lack of systematization concerning the use and definition of terms poses problems for physicians and biomedical professionals. We are introducing here the Blood Ontology, an ongoing initiative designed to serve as a controlled vocabulary for use in organizing information about blood. The paper describes the scope of the Blood Ontology, its stage of development and some (...) of its anticipated uses. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo las críticas que presenta George Berkeley, filósofo y Obispo de Cloyne, a la noción de fluxón que Newton introduce en su desarrollo delcálculo fluxional. En su propuesta Isaac Newton considera que se puede hablar dedos tipos de puntos: los puntos sin dimensiones y aquellos que surgen del movimiento y que pueden tener alguna clase de medida/magnitud/métrica, es gracias a la existencia de estos últimos que Newton puede realizar el cálculo de la fluxión aun cuando al final (...) del procedimiento, vuelva a considerarlo como un punto sin dimensiones. Una vez expuesta la propuesta de Newton sobre las fluxiones,presentaré la crítica de Berkeley a diversos elementos tanto conceptuales como metodológicos del trabajo de su predecesor, Finalmente ofreceré algunas conclusiones acerca de la validez de las críticas del obispo de Cloyne a Newton. -/- . (shrink)

We separate metaphysical from epistemic questions in the evaluation of models, taking into account the distinctive functions of models as opposed to theories. The examples a\are very varied.

This chapter reviews empirical research on the rules governing assertion and retraction, with a focus on the normative role of truth. It examines whether truth is required for an assertion to be considered permissible, and whether there is an expectation that speakers retract statements that turn out to be false. Contrary to factive norms (such as the influential “knowledge norm”), empirical data suggests that there is no expectation that speakers only make true assertions. Additionally, contrary to truth-relativist accounts, there is (...) no requirement for speakers to retract statements that are false at the context of assessment. We conclude by suggesting that truth still plays a crucial role in the evaluation of assertions: as a standard for evaluating their success, rather than permissibility. (shrink)

La Hipótesis del Continuo (HC) es la suposición de que dado el primer transfinito, ℵ0 , el cardinal de los naturales; el siguiente cardinal, ℵ1 , es el cardinal de los números reales. La Hipótesis Generalizada del Continuo es que dado un transfinito ℵn , el siguiente transfinito es el conjunto potencia de dicho transfinito ℵn+1 = P(ℵn). Desde la teoría intuitiva de conjuntos cantoriana se ha tratado conocer si en dicha teoría se sigue HC. Sin embargo Cantor no pudo (...) probar HC. Tiempo después Gödel y Cohen probarán que HC es independiente a la teoría de conjuntos ZF ó ZFC, si se acepta eleccíon. Después del trabajo de Cohen, Gödel planteo un programa para extender, axiomáticamente, ZFC con el cual se pudiera conocer sí en ZFC HC se sigue, o se sigue ¬HC. Hoy en día aun se desconoce una extensíon HC ó ¬HC en ZFC. Gutiérrez plantea que de hecho posiblemente hoy en día no hay extensíon axiomática filosóficamente adecuada que pueda determinar si en ZFC se sigue HC ó ¬HC. Desde la perspectiva de Gutiérrez, dado que no existe una extensíon adecuada en ZFC para determinar HC, se puede decir que HC es absolutamente indecidible. Esta conferencia se tratará de entender los conceptos de absoluta indecidibilidad planteada por Gutiérrez, el porqué considera que sucede esto con respecto a HC en ZFC y algunas posibles soluciones que podrían explorarse. (shrink)

En este artículo describo la forma de trabajar de Newton ante los textos descubiertos en la segunda mitad del siglo xx. Tradicionalmente se ha asociado a Newton con la metodología cartesiana, sin embargo, esto es una equivocación cronológica. Si bien la mecánica clásica es posible identificarla con el mecanicismo y también con el mecanicismo cartesiano, el sistema que desarrolla Newton tiene otros objetivos. El más importante es probar la magnificencia de Dios. Considero que los objetivos y la metodología de Newton (...) son exactamente lo opuesto a Descartes, ya que para Descartes la ciencia parte de los principios a priori, mientras que Newton considera que la ciencia parte de la experimentación. (shrink)

Se buscará mostrar que las críticas de Berkeley son pertinentes al mostrar que Newton utiliza una justificación que se bása en: 1) La experiecia sensible y 2)En una noción de Dios como poder activo. Con respecto a 1) si bien se puede justificar un método con la experiencia sensible, este no dejara este ámbito y no es posible pasar a las matemáticas con este metodo. Con respecto a 2) Dios es una fuente de justificación posbile para la época, sin embargo (...) en Newton se convierte en un poder activo que se contrapone a otras fomas de entender a Dios como garante de las leyes, más no como un poder que intervenga en el mundo. (shrink)

Se puede considerar que Berkeley y Hume son antecedentes filosóficos del Formalismo Matemático. Ambos sostienen una visión instrumentalista y no-realista de las matemáticas. En la conferencia se explora las diferencias y similitudes de ambos autores, así como el porque se les puede considerar ser antecesores del Formalismo.

Moorean constructions are famously odd: it is infelicitous to deny that you believe what you claim to be true. But what about claiming that p, only to immediately put into question your evidence in support of p? In this paper, we identify and analyse a class of quasi-Moorean constructions, which we label counterevidentials. Although odd, counterevidentials can be accommodated as felicitous attempts to mitigate one’s claim right after making it. We explore how counterevidentials differ from lexicalised mitigation operators, parentheticals, and (...) anaphoric mitigation devices, and consider some cognate non-assertoric constructions. We conclude by exploring the implications of our analysis for theorising about linguistic responsibility, assertion, and lying. (shrink)

Este capítulo de libro argumenta que la formulación de estrategias de adaptación en el caso de Cartagena necesita adoptar una visión integral de la resiliencia ante los impactos económicos y sociales de los riesgos climáticos. Para lograrlo, el sector privado y público tienen que integrar a la comunidad afectada, sin apartarse del contexto y respaldando el desarrollo de las capacidades sostenibles, la implementación sólida de proyectos, así como la sostenibilidad de las estrategias de adaptación climática. El principal objetivo es, por (...) lo tanto, determinar la importancia del componente incluyente de la resiliencia para reducir las problemáticas al formular estrategias de adaptación climática en ciudades específicas. (shrink)

One of the most influential and controversial schools of 20th century Thomism—especially in North America—is the “River Forest School” or “River Forest Thomism”. And one of the most influential and controversial theses associated with that school is the thesis that metaphysics cannot be established as a distinct and autonomous science unless one has already proven the existence of a positively immaterial being. The purpose of this paper is to show that River Forest Thomism cannot and should not be reduced to (...) that controversial thesis. As such, rejection of the thesis cannot and should not constitute a rejection of the school. Indeed, as soon as we understand what River Forest Thomism was really about, it will become clear that all Thomists should be River Forest Thomists. (shrink)

Electronic health records (EHRs) serve as repositories of documented data collected in a health care encounter. An EHR records information about who receives, who provides the health care and about the place where the encounter happens. We also observe additional elements relating to social relations in which the healthcare consumer is involved. To provide a consensus representation of common data and to enhance interoperability between different EHR repositories we have created a solution grounded in formal ontology. Here, we present how (...) an ontology for the obstetric and neonatal domain deals with these general elements documented in health care encounters. Our goal is to promote the interoperability of information among EHRs created in different specialties. To develop our ontology, we used two main approaches: one based on ontological realism, the other based on the principles of the OBO Foundry, including reuse of reference ontologies. (shrink)

This paper presents the Obstetric and Neonatal Ontology (OntONeo). This ontology has been created to provide a consensus representation of salient electronic health record (EHR) data and to serve interoperability of the associated data and information systems. More generally, it will serve interoperability of clinical and translational data, for example deriving from genomics disciplines and from clinical trials. Interoperability of EHR data is important to ensuring continuity of care during the prenatal and postnatal periods for both mother and child. As (...) a strategy to advance such interoperability we use an approach based on ontological realism and on the ontology development principles of the Open Biomedical Ontologies Foundry, including reuse of reference ontologies wherever possible. We describe the structure and coverage domain of OntONeo and the process of creating and maintaining the ontology. (shrink)

El presente texto presenta los resultados de un estudio exploratorio de las interacciones entre el sistema de gobernanza y de los actores como causa de la contaminación del arroyo de San Basilio de Palenque en Colombia. Lo anterior, a partir de la validación de la metodología de enfoque de sistemas socio-ecológicos como método de caracterización de conflictos ambientales con impactos culturales.

We describe the rationale for an application ontology covering the domain of human body fluids that is designed to facilitate representation, reuse, sharing and integration of diagnostic, physiological, and biochemical data, We briefly review the Blood Ontology (BLO), Saliva Ontology (SALO) and Kidney and Urinary Pathway Ontology (KUPO) initiatives. We discuss the methods employed in each, and address the project of using them as starting point for a unified body fluids ontology resource. We conclude with a description of how the (...) body fluids ontology initiative may provide support to basic and translational science. (shrink)

We call for a new philosophical conception of models in physics. Some standard conceptions take models to be useful approximations to theorems, that are the chief means to test theories. Hence the heuristics of model building is dictated by the requirements and practice of theory-testing. In this paper we argue that a theory-driven view of models can not account for common procedures used by scientists to model phenomena. We illustrate this thesis with a case study: the construction of one of (...) the first comprehensive model of superconductivity by London brothers in 1934. Instead of theory-driven view of models, we suggest a phenomenologically-driven one. (shrink)

En el presente texto se aborda la discusión entre economistas y abogados acerca del control judicial en aspectos económicos con el propósito de mostrar el carácter democrático de éste. El análisis contendrá tres partes: (i) contextualización del debate a partir del principio de distribución de poderes; (ii) planteamiento del debate a partir de dos lecturas de la Constitución de 1991, ya sea que se enfatice en el liberalismo clásico contenido en la carta o en lo “social” del Estado Social de (...) Derecho de la misma; (iii) por último, se abordarán algunas de las principales críticas al control constitucional en cuestiones económicas, así como el análisis de la legitimidad y conveniencia de dicho control. En esta última parte se hará especial énfasis en la objeción de que la intervención judicial en la economía sería antidemocrática y la respuesta que a la misma puede plantearse. (shrink)

El presente estudio ofrece una interpretación de naturaleza ontológica a uno de los fenómenos más divulgados recientemente por los medios informativos de comunicación: la displicencia de los sujetos al seguimiento de normas sociales. El trabajo se centra, especialmente, en los casos en los que se asume que la indiferencia a las normas tiene como causa la condición del privilegiado social. Argumenta que la inobservancia a las normas, más que ser un asunto de desigualdad social, es la sintomatología de importantes hendiduras (...) en la ontología de la realidad social. Así, tres partes conforman este trabajo. En la primera se describen algunos casos que, desde los medios de comunicación, se presentan como representativos en la inobservancia a las normas sociales, especialmente, aquellos que son interpretados como un asunto de abuso de privilegio social. En la segunda parte, a partir de algunos trabajos de John Austin, Ulises Moulines y Gottlob Frege, se presenta una concepción de normas sociales, y su valor para la construcción de la ontología social. En la tercera parte, desde la propuesta del filósofo John Searle, se describen algunos rasgos esenciales de la ontología de la realidad social. Se concluye que el no seguimiento de las normas sociales socava los modos de existencia de la realidad social, y que los casos interpretados por los medios de comunicación como asunto de desigualdad social, requieren una interpretación que tenga en cuenta la estructura de la realidad social. (shrink)

[Spanish Abstract] El presente texto presenta los resultados de un estudio exploratorio de las interacciones entre el sistema de gobernanza y de los actores como causa de la contaminación del arroyo de San Basilio de Palenque en Colombia. Lo anterior, a partir de la validación de la metodología de enfoque de sistemas socio-ecológicos como método de caracterización de conflictos ambientales con impactos culturales. [English Abstract] This paper presents the results of an exploratory study of the interactions between the governance system (...) and the actors as a cause of contamination of the San Basilio de Palenque river in Colombia. To do so, the methodology of the socio-ecological systems approach was validated as a method of characterizing environmental conflicts with cultural impacts. (shrink)

Convocada por diferentes estudiosos de los Padres de la Iglesia y del cristianismo antiguo en Latinoamérica, a saber, los profesores Ana Cristina Villa Betancourt, Andrés Mauricio Quevedo Rodríguez y Estiven Valencia Marín, de Colombia; Alejandro Nicola y Francisco Basttita-Harriet, de Argentina; Bruno Gripp, de Brasil; Pamela Chávez Aguilar, de Chile; y Jesús Ma. Aguiñaga Fernández, de México.

Existen diversos tipos de realismo matemático. Desde una perspectiva filosófica, en la mayoría de los casos, los realistas asumen algunas o todas de las siguientes tesis: 1) Existen los objetos matemáticos; 2) Los objetos matemáticos son abstractos y 3)Los objetos matemáticos son independientes a agentes, lenguajes y prácticas. En este trabajo discutiré algunos problemas con respecto al tercer punto, referente a la independencia entre el lenguaje y los objetos matemáticos. La independencia del lenguaje implica que, sin importar el lenguaje que (...) se utilice, el objeto matemático será el mismo. En mi opinión, se puede problematizar esta idea de independencia; y para mostrar esto presentaré algunos ejemplos en los sistemas de numeración indoarábigo y romano, en los que el lenguaje parece incidir en el entendimiento y las operaciones aritméticas de los números naturales. Con esto se abre la puerta a otras maneras posibles de entender la relación entre los pretendidos objetos matemáticos y los lenguajes que los describen. (shrink)